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Logical connectives familiar from the study of hybrid logic can be added to the logical framework LF, a
constructive type theory of dependent functions. This extension turns out to be an attractively simple one,
and maintains all the usual theoretical and algorithmic properties, for example decidability of type-checking.
Moreover it results in a rich metalanguage for encoding and reasoning about a range of resource-sensitive
substructural logics, analagous to the use of LF as a metalanguage for more ordinary logics.
This family of applications of the language, contrary perhaps to expectations of how hybridized systems
are typically used, does not require the usual modal connectives box and diamond, nor any internalization
of a Kripke accessibility relation. It does, however, make essential use of distinctively hybrid connectives:
universal quantiﬁation over worlds, truth of a proposition at a named world, and local binding of the current
world. This supports the claim that the innovations of hybrid logic have independent value even apart from
their traditional relationship to temporal and alethic modal logics.
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1 Introduction
The notion of hybrid logic has emerged as an intermediate point in the space between
modal logics and the ﬁrst-order logics in which they can be soundly embedded. By
providing, within the language of propositions itself, ways of explicitly referring to
and manipulating modal worlds, hybridization can recover much of the expressive-
ness of ﬁrst-order logic without entirely sacriﬁcing the simplicity and metatheoretic
felicities of a more basic modal language.
The story of the present piece of work has essentially the same form: by taking
the logical framework LF and judiciously adding hybrid logical connectives, which
explicitly name, bind and make use of a certain notion of ‘world,’ we achieve sig-
niﬁcant gains in expressiveness without making the resulting language so strong as
to cause failure of familiar desirable properties of the system as a whole. A key
diﬀerence is that the starting point in our case is not a modal logic, but rather a
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logical system that lacks any obvious intrinsic notion of world 3 . Thus we add such
a notion, and furthermore endow it with an algebraic operation inspired by the
semantics for bunched logic given by Galmiche and Me´ry [13]. Also worth noting
is that the present system is, as is typical for logical frameworks but not for hybrid
logics, a constructive logic, locating it within a small but growing body of work on
intuitionistic and constructive hybrid logics [18,20,5,6].
The contribution of hybridization in this case is the set of connectives ∀, @p, ↓,
which respectively quantify over variables that stand for worlds, shift the perspec-
tive of a proposition to a new world p, and bind the current world to a variable.
This choice of connectives is suﬃcient for a surprisingly large set of applications.
Even without adding the typically modal structure of the connectives , , and an
internalization of the Kripke accessibility, we are able to easily build a system that
• generalizes the linear logical framework LLF [7]
• faithfully encodes the family of ‘usage analysis’ function types→n [32] that require
exactly n uses of their argument.
• faithfully encodes a signiﬁcant fragment of the logic of Bunched Implications [22]
(the connectives −∗,→,∧,)
• provides a language in which one can state linear metatheorems, thus achieving
an ‘internal’ and simpliﬁed version of the system described by McCreight and
Schu¨rmann [19].
This last application, discussed in Section 3.3, was in fact the principal motivation
that led us to design the present system. We did not set out in the beginning
to ﬁnd out what could be expressed when hybrid connectives were added to LF;
rather, we searched for a system in which linear metatheorems could be formulated.
Hybridization was, in eﬀect, then forced upon us, as we discovered it to be by far
the most natural way of achieving our goal, and furthermore it also supports the
other applications mentioned.
As another argument for the naturalness of the extension, all three hybrid con-
nectives mentioned are related in a way that arises from considerations of focused
proofs [1] in that they are all right asynchronous. In particular, the natural deduc-
tion introduction rules for each connective are invertible, i.e. inference from the
conclusion of the rule to its premise is also sound. This is why, for instance, ↓ is
taken as a primitive and not the related connective ∃, which falls outside the right
asynchronous fragment. A more thorough history of the role of ↓ as primitive vs.
deﬁned in terms of ∃ in various systems is given by Blackburn [4].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we sketch the
deﬁnition of the hybrid logical framework HLF, and discuss substitution, normaliza-
tion, and decidability properties of it. Section 3 gives some example encodings and
applications. Section 4 describes related work, Section 5 outlines future possibilities,
and Section 6 provides concluding comments.
3 If one looks to LLF rather than LF, arguably the former does have some notion of ‘world’ already,
inasmuch as it is resource-sensitive at all, but one which is considerably more buried than in modal logics.
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2 The Hybrid Logical Framework HLF
2.1 Motivation
Before we begin a more formal treatment of the system, let us brieﬂy consider some
examples from linear logic that give insight into how hybridization arose naturally
out of other concerns.
Linear logic [14] is a logic of resources. It has a context that does not admit
contraction or weakening, and so enforces that every assumption obeys the resource
discipline of being consumed exactly once. For example, the sequent A B,A 	 B
(where  is linear implication) is provable, because the implication A  B and
its argument A get consumed in producing B. Neither A (A B), A 	 B nor
A  B,A,A 	 B are provable, the former because there are too few copies of A
in the context (we cannot use contraction to duplicate it as we can in the ordinary
natural deduction proof of A ⊃ A ⊃ B,A 	 B) and the latter because there is an
extra copy of A (which we cannot use weakening to elide).
Trying to generalize this resource discipline in certain directions (similar to
Wright’s usage analysis [32]) led us to consider existing work on reducing substruc-
tural properties of the context (e.g. contraction, weakening) to algebraic properties
of labels that are attached to deductions, i.e. labelled deduction [12]. Such systems
constitute an entirely sensible reconsideration of the meaning of resource use in their
own right.
Along these lines one replaces each linear hypothesis with an ordinary hypoth-
esis, but labelled by a unique identiﬁer that acts as a name for its role as a con-
sumable resource; instead of the context A  B,A,A we might say something
like A  B[α], A[β], A[γ]. Now the two occurrences of A in the context are dis-
tinguished as diﬀerent resources that can (and must) be consumed independently.
Now conclusions from these hypotheses are also labelled, by an expression that lists
resources that they actually consume. In this way we could express the failure
of the linear sequent A ⊃ A ⊃ B,A 	 B as the failure of the labelled sequent
A ⊃ B[α], A[β], A[γ] 	 B[α · β · γ]: given resource α of type A ⊃ B, resources β, γ
both of type A, we cannot achieve B by consuming all three resources α, β, γ.
One simple advantage of this approach is it lets us return to having contexts that
do satisfy weakening and contraction. Adding further copies of, e.g. the hypothesis
A[β] to the context doesn’t harm anything, for it is the labels such as β that enforce
the substructural nature of the logic.
The major advantage, however, and the one that is pertinent to this paper,
is that by exposing the labelled side of substructural logics, we are but a small
distance away from hybridization. We need only consider that these resource labels
are something like modal worlds, and the meaning of the implication  emerges
clearly as a statement in the hybrid language that refers to them: A  B is
achievable by consuming resources p (‘at world p’) if, for any hypothetical resource
named α that has type A, we can produce B by consuming all the resources p
plus the resource α (‘at the local current world combined with α’). We will see in
Section 3 precisely how to phrase this in terms of ∀, ↓,@.
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2.2 Deﬁnition
Understanding our presentation of HLF obviously beneﬁts from some familiarity
with LF, [15,16] the system it is based on, but we provide a little background here
nonetheless. LF is a λ-calculus in the Automath family, which deﬁnes a decidable
typing judgment for dependently typed terms. Since dependent types are present,
i.e. equality of types depends on equality of terms, equality on terms (usually deﬁned
up to β− and optionally η− conversion) also must be (and in fact is) decidable. The
basic syntax of the language of HLF includes, as LF does, a notion of terms and
type families, and furthermore a category of expressions that describe worlds:
Worlds p, q, r ::= α | p1 · p2 | 
Terms M ::= λx.M | M N | x | c
Type Families A ::= Πx:A.B | A M | a | ∀α.A | ↓α.A | @pA
Contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, x : A | Γ, α : world
World expressions, recall, are meant to describe resource use. They can be
world variables α, the ‘concatenation’ of two other world expressions, (i.e. the
simultaneous use of two sets of resources) or else the empty resource , which as a
unit for concatenation makes it a monoid. The language of terms is in fact identical
to that of LF. It includes function expressions, function application, variables x,
and primitive constants c. The notion of type is where HLF diverges from LF.
Familiar from LF are dependent function types Πx:A.B, application of dependent
type families to arguments A M , and primitive constant type families a. What HLF
adds is the remaining three type constructors, ∀, ↓,@p. The contexts Γ in which
terms are typechecked are built up from the empty context by adding hypotheses
of term variables x assumed to be at some type A, and world variables α.
The central typing judgment of HLF is
Γ 	 M : A[p]
pronounced as ‘in the context Γ, the term M has type A at world p’. This diﬀers
from LF’s by the addition of the world expression p.
In order to deﬁne this judgment, make the following deﬁnitions: Let {M/x}
and {p/α} denote (capture-avoiding) substitution of terms for variables and worlds
for world-variables respectively. Let Γ 	 A ≡ B : type denote type-directed deﬁni-
tional equality (as in [16]) and p ≡ACU q denote equality of world expressions up to
Associativity and Commutativity of ·, and Unit laws for  with respect to ·. Let Σ
be a signature of declarations of typed constants.
Then the deﬁnition of the judgment Γ 	 M : A[p] may be given by a set of
typing rules, as follows:
x : A ∈ Γ
var
Γ  x : A[]
c : A ∈ Σ
const
Γ  c : A[]
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Γ  A ≡ B : type Γ  p ≡ACU q Γ  M : A[p]
tconv
Γ  M : B[q]
Γ, x : A  M : B[p]
ΠI
Γ  λx.M : Πx:A.B[p]
Γ  M : Πx:A.B[p] Γ  N : A[]
ΠE
Γ  M N : ({N/x}B)[p]
Γ, α : world  M : B[p]
∀I
Γ  M : ∀α.B[p]
Γ  M : ∀α.B[p] Γ  q : world
∀E
Γ  M : ({q/α}B)[p]
Γ  M : ({p/α}B)[p]
↓I
Γ  M : ↓α.B[p]
Γ  M : ↓α.B[p]
↓E
Γ  M : ({p/α}B)[p]
Γ  M : A[p]
@I
Γ  M : @pA[q]
Γ  M : @pA[q]
@E
Γ  M : A[p]
The auxiliary judgment Γ 	 p : world simply establishes that all variables in p in
fact occur in the context Γ. This description of the system is considerably simpliﬁed
from the full version being developed [27] but it contains most the essential features.
There are standard side conditions on variable occurrences in rules: introduction of
quantiﬁers such as Π,∀ require that the bound variables they introduce are fresh,
etc. We have also omitted the additive connectives &,.
Since the term language is the same as LF’s, the role of the hybrid connectives
is merely to allow description of reﬁnements (that is to say, subsets of the terms) of
existing types. To establish that a term M has the type ∀α.A, we simply hypothesize
a fresh α, and continue checking that M has type A, which may refer to α. The
way that we can use the knowledge that M has type ∀α.A is by instantiating the
universal quantiﬁer with any other valid world. The binder ↓ operates similarly,
except that it ﬁxes the instantiation to be the whatever the current world is as it
is being typechecked. Finally, the type operator @p ‘transfers’ to the world p, in a
manner similar to the appearance of @ in other hybrid logics.
The type conversion rule tconv usually serves to realize the action of βη-conversion
within types. If two types are convertible, then any term that has one type has the
other; thus they are the same type. Here we also allow ‘world conversion,’ doing
the same thing for the monoid equations on worlds. If a term is well-typed at one
world, it is also well-typed at any ACU-equivalent world.
We ought also to comment on the use of the ‘empty’ world  in several rules.
In var and const, it means that directly using a variable from the context or using
a constant from the signature does not consume any resources. That is, the single
context of the judgment is a context of unrestricted hypotheses in the sense of [11].
To express hypotheses that are restricted, e.g. that a variable of type A is only
available via the consumption of a resources p, one uses the @p type operator,
putting in the context a hypothesis x : @pA.
In ΠE, the use of  signiﬁes that Π is still the unrestricted dependent function
type from [11,7]. The arguments of such functions must typecheck at world . It is
important for our intended encodings that we retain such a type constructor that
corresponds exactly to the Π of the source of the encoding. It may well be that
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adding other dependent type constructors to the system that don’t refer explicitly
to  could work, but we have not yet investigated this possibility.
However, we can already use Π and @p together to express function types that
do use resources. In particular, the primitive implication in Brau¨ner and de Paiva’s
hybridization of intuitionistic logic [5,6] diﬀers from ours (in that it requires the
argument of an implication to be checked at the same world as the conclusion,
rather than at any distinguished world such as our ) but we can easily encode their
A ⊃ B in our language as ↓α.Πx:(@αA).B, or equivalently (using the standard
abbreviation A → B for Πx:A.B when x doesn’t occur in B) as ↓α.(@αA → B).
2.3 Metatheory
To actually prove all the results that follow, we made use of techniques developed
relatively recently by Watkins et al. [8,9] For space reasons, we do not give full
details here, but refer to [27] for at least a formulation of the system that makes
these proofs much easier than they would be in traditional form. The general idea of
such techniques is to avoid deﬁning ﬁrst the set of all the terms of the language (i.e.
including those that have β-redices) and subsequently simply showing (typically by
a logical relations argument such as [16]) that every term has a canonical form that
it reduces to.
Instead one deﬁnes the language in the ﬁrst place from the perspective that what
really matters is the set of canonical forms. By giving a syntax that only admits
canonical forms, and by deﬁning substitution in such a way that it carries out
normalization in a hereditary and terminating fashion, the normalization theorem
for all well-typed terms follows as a simple inductive corollary.
The reason this can be done is that the substitution function is annotated with
the type of the variable being substituted for, and so induction proceeds princi-
pally on the structure of the types, even though during the course of carrying out
reductions the terms involved may become larger.
In this formulation, it is extremely important (and not at all diﬃcult) to show
that substitution is correct vis-a-vis the typing judgment:
Lemma 2.1 (Substitution of Terms) If Γ 	 M : A[] and Γ, x : A,Γ′ 	 N :
B[q], then
Γ, σΓ′ 	 σN : σB[q]
where σ abbreviates the substitution {M/x}.
Lemma 2.2 (Substitution of Worlds) Suppose p is a valid world, i.e. Γ 	 p :
world.
• If Γ, α : world,Γ′ 	 N : B[q], then Γ, σΓ′ 	 σN : σB[σq]
• Γ, α : world,Γ′ 	 q : world, then Γ, σΓ′ 	 σq : world
where σ abbreviates the substitution {p/α}.
Once this is done, a result that is usually somewhat more involved becomes
almost trivial:
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Proposition 2.3 (Normalization) Every well-typed term normalizes to a canon-
ical (β-normal, η-long) form.
The most important remaining issue is the decidability of type-checking. Al-
though there are several places in the above presentation where this proposition is
not clearly true, there is one that is most essential: the rule ∀E. Since q does not
appear anywhere in the term language, it seems we must ‘guess’ from the term and
the type in front of us what it is.
In fact, however, we have formulated and partially implemented an algorithm
that tracks residual constraints on these unknown worlds, postponing them as uniﬁ-
cation variables until such time as they are constrained by typechecking other parts
of the term. This approach is rather standard, and is much like how type inference
typically works in programming languages. In particular the type conversion rule
tconv is the source of uniﬁcation equations (up to ACU) on worlds.
In other words, one can reduce type-checking in this system to the problem of
equational uniﬁcation over associativity, commutativity, and unit laws, well-known
in the literature as ACU-uniﬁcation, and achieve the following result:
Proposition 2.4 (Decidability of Type-Checking) Given a well-formed context Γ,
term M , type A, and world p, it is decidable whether there is a derivation of Γ 	
M : A[p].
In fact, since we have no other function, constant, or relation symbols besides
· and , we require only a fragment of ACU-uniﬁcation that is easily seen to be
decidable by reduction from the problem of determining solvability of systems of
linear diophantine equations. This means that other algorithms of great practical
importance to the front-end of systems such as Twelf [24] that depend on uniﬁcation,
such as type reconstruction, are very likely to admit extensions to be compatible
with worlds as well. In general, extending our approach to other substructural
logics requires understanding related equational uniﬁcation problems, which have
been widely studied.
One might reasonably ask why it is that ∀ doesn’t take an argument and thereby
behave more like a function type. In this case its introduction and elimination rules
might look like
Γ, α : world 	 M : B[p]
∀I
Γ 	 Λα.M : ∀α.B[p]
Γ 	 M : ∀α.B[p] Γ 	 q : world
∀E
Γ 	 M • q : ({q/α}B)[p]
for new term constructors Λ, • that create and eliminate world-abstracting functions.
This would establish the decidability type-checking problem far more neatly, since
there wouldn’t be important information patently missing from terms, which we
then go to some pains to prove that we can recover. This is a valid alternative,
though we haven’t pursued it very far as of yet. There don’t seem to be any major
diﬃculties, and indeed it seems to be more compatible with categorical semantics,
but its fatal ﬂaw is that it is not compatible with the vast majority of applications
we care about: if worlds appear in terms, then the system can distinguish more
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terms than it could before. In this proposed alternative, the reason that terms
are type-correct is suddenly more fully manifest in the terms themselves, and so
diﬀerent reasons amount to diﬀerent terms, leading to a system that no longer is,
for instance, a proper extension of LLF. It is possible that explicitly quotienting out
this extra information via the idea of proof irrelevance [23] could solve this issue,
but we leave this to future work.
3 Applications
As mentioned, the application that motivated our work was trying to achieve a clean
encoding into a logical framework of the statement of theorems about substructural
logics. Ideally this we would be able to adapt of the body of metatheoretic algo-
rithms developed for LF[25,28,30] and we would then be able to formally state and
mechanically check in software properties of substructural logics and languages in
a far more natural way. We can presently do this, but only with much greater ef-
fort, in existing software systems such as Twelf, which are more suited to languages
without substructural features.
This goal is not a recent innovation; previous systems such as LLF [7], RLF
[17], and CLF [8,9] are signiﬁcant milestones in the development of substructural
logical frameworks. They are already languages in which one can write proofs (and,
being constructive proofs, these are essentially programs) but what is missing is a
language for stating with suﬃcient precision what theorems these proofs actually
prove, and tools for checking such claims. We claim that HLF is such a language,
and we plan to develop appropriate tools.
We begin by explaining how HLF is a generalization of the linear logical frame-
work LLF.
3.1 Embedding LLF
The language of LLF [7] extends LF with features of linear logic. The context in
LLF has unrestricted hypotheses x : A which may be used any number of times,
and linear hypotheses x :ˆ A that express resources that must be used exactly once.
The logical connectives taken from linear logic are,&,.
The connectives &, can be mapped directly onto the connectives of the same
name in HLF, which we have not discussed, because they are of little relevance to
the hybridization of the system. What is interesting from that perspective is the
connective . Make the following deﬁnition. If A is a type of LLF, then A∗ is A
with every subexpression B C of it replaced by
↓α.∀β.((@βB)→ (@α·βC))
(where again A → B is an abbreviation for Πx:A.B, and where α, β are fresh
variables) This ‘macro expansion’ of B  C decomposes it as meaning: let the
current resources be called α. For any extra resources β, if we can produce B with
β, then we can produce C with α and β together.
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With this encoding we obtain the result that the logical framework LLF embeds
faithfully as a subsystem of HLF:
Proposition 3.1 The closed LLF terms well-typed at any LLF type A are in bijec-
tive correspondence to the closed HLF terms at type A∗, at world .
In fact this bijection is only a bureacratic detail away from being an identity. If
we start with a variant of LLF that does not syntactically distinguish unrestricted
function expressions from linear function expressions, then we would obtain the
stronger result
Proposition 3.2 Let A be an LLF type, and Γ an LLF context. The system LLF
derives Γ 	 M : A if and only if the system HLF derives Γ∗ 	 M : A∗[αΓ],
where the operation Γ∗ on contexts is deﬁned by
(Γ, x : A)∗ = Γ∗, x : A∗
(Γ, x :ˆ A)∗ = Γ∗, αx : world, x : @αx(A
∗) (αx fresh)
and where αΓ is a ·-delimited list of αx for each x :ˆ B ∈ Γ.
3.2 Usage Analysis Types
A generalization of the previous encoding that is also easy to achieve in this language
is the idea of the function type →n, which requires its argument to be used exactly




β · · · · · β
and then deﬁne →n as a macro for
A →n B ≡ ↓α.∀β.((@βA)→ (@α·βnB))
3.3 Metatheory for the Linear Logical Framework
A common use for LF and its implementation Twelf is to encode logics and proofs of
properties about them by writing recursive functions in relational style that trans-
form derivations of the logic being studied. For example, a cut elimination proof
for intuitionistic logic can be stated by making the declaration of a type family (i.e.
a three-place relation)
cut-admissibility : ΠA : o.ΠB : o.
conc A → (hyp A → conc B) → conc B → type
This declaration together with mode declarations to the eﬀect that there are sup-
posed to be input derivations of conc A and (hyp A → conc B) and an output of
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conc B constitute the speciﬁcation for a program, which if written, is a constructive
proof of
Fact 3.3 (Cut Admissibility) If Γ 	 A and Γ, A 	 B, then Γ 	 B.
for ordinary propositional logic. Now the linear cut admissibility theorem behaves
diﬀerently:
Fact 3.4 (Linear Cut Admissibility) If Γ 	 A and Δ, A 	 B, then Γ,Δ 	 B.
It involves contexts that must be combined as lists of resources, and so if we cannot
write speciﬁcations that take this into account, we cannot state as powerful theorems
as we would like. We can only state weaker theorems whose proofs might mismanage
the context and still pass muster according to the formal checker.
One can (and we did for a long time!) try to mix linearity and dependency
to leverage linear connectives to express relationships between contexts in such a
theorem, saying something like
cut-admissibility : ΠA : o.ΠB : o.
((conc A⊗ (hyp A conc B)) & conc B) type
However, we were never able to make this into a completely satisfactory system.
What does work elegantly is the language of hybrid connectives, as follows:
cut-admissibility : ΠA : o.ΠB : o.∀α.∀β.
@α(conc A)→ @β(hyp A conc B)→ @α·β(conc B)→ type
Here we are able to refer explicitly to worlds that stand in place of contexts in
the statement of the theorem we wish to verify. In this way the formal theorem
plainly resembles the informal version, thus giving us even greater conﬁdence that
the formalization is correct.
3.4 Embedding Bunched Logic
One can also embed several connectives from the logic of bunched implications [22]
in much the same way as the linear embedding. Here we merely need to say that
bunched ∧ maps onto HLF &, bunched  maps onto HLF , and the bunched mul-
tiplicative and additive arrow −∗,→ are translated by macro expansion as follows:
A−∗B ≡ ↓α.∀β.((@βA) → (@α·βB))
A → B ≡ ↓α.((@αA) → B)
Note that the encoding of −∗ is precisely the same as that of , and that the
encoding of the bunched additive arrow is the same as Brau¨ner-de Paiva implication
mentioned in Section 2.2.
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4 Related Work
It has long been recognized that there is an enormous potential gain in expressivity
of a logic that comes with the ability to explicitly refer to some sort of world that
parametrizes the judgment of truth of propositions, whether conceived modally as
possible worlds in hybrid logic [2,4], or thought of as abstract labels in labelled
deduction [12,31,26], or concretely in recent research into mobile programs as hosts
on a network network hosts [20,18,21].
The important immediate predecessors to our work within the arena of hybrid
logics are the constructive systems of hybrid logic independently devised by Brau¨ner
and de Paiva [5,6] Jia and Walker [18] and Chadha et al. [10] Our contributions
relative to these consist of adapting the connectives to a dependently typed system,
and to a notion of world that supports a monoidal structure (this notion of world
by itself, is of course not original to the present work, see for instance the work of
Galmiche and Me´ry [13]).
On the logical frameworks side, McCreight and Schu¨rmann developed a met-
alogic L+ω [19] for LLF, parallel to the metalogic M
+
ω for LF that is the subject
of Schu¨rmann’s thesis [29]. The logic L+ω , broadly speaking, is a solution to the
same metatheoretic encoding problem that we aimed to solve, but to deﬁne L+ω it
is necessary to quantify over variables that stand for linear contexts, which leads
to signiﬁcant complications and concerns about predicativity. Our solution avoids
these by replacing quantiﬁcation over contexts with quantiﬁcation over worlds, which
are simpler and more manageable, since they abstract away just those features that
are essential for describing how contexts are manipulated. Moreover our system
permits encodings of metatheorems and proofs in HLF itself, a noteworthy practi-
cal advantage already enjoyed by standard practices embedding metatheorems and
proofs in LF.
The idea of more intimately blending resource use with dependent types, which
in principle could also provide a non-hybrid answer to our problem, appears in
the system RLF developed by Ishtiaq and Pym [17]. What they call ‘linearity’ in
that work, however, is not the idea of resources that must be used exactly once,
but rather at least once, i.e. a logic of relevant implication. We conjecture that
their approach, which apparently fundamentally allows ‘linear’ variables to appear
both in a term and its type, cannot be extended to accomodate linearity in the
exactly-one-use sense.
5 Future Work
Our highest priority is to understand how to use this system to fully solve the
problem that motivated its development in the ﬁrst place: the problem of encoding
and mechanically checking proofs about encodings of substructural logics in logical
frameworks such as LLF. This problem has received copious attention in the case
of more ordinary encodings into LF.
For us it remains to adapt several pieces of the metatheory of LF, and the
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theory of logic programs encoded in it. First of all, the operational semantics
for logic programming over HLF needs to be understood, but this is likely to be
relatively simple, since it is likely we can treat worlds much like terms ‘of type
world’ and ∀ much like Π. We will need to extend speciﬁcations of input-output
behavior (called mode speciﬁcations [28]) to apply to quantiﬁed world variables, and
determine whether existing conservative termination checking algorithms [25] still
apply. We expect most of the diﬃculty to arise in understanding the right way
to adapt coverage checking [30], which is critical in the mechanization of proofs
represented as programs that compute (generally partial) functions. A function
that works by case analysis must cover all cases to be total, and it must be a total
function to represent a correct proof.
Although in this paper we speciﬁcally did not focus on modal logics that feature
an accessibility relation, there is no reason yet apparent why it should not be com-
patible with the given system. The main issue there the decidability of uniﬁcation
in the theory of worlds, concatenation, and an accessibility relation between worlds
with some ﬁxed axioms on it, for the decidability of type-checking hinges on this
problem.
We would like to exhibit a categorical semantics and prove soundness and com-
pleteness with respect to the current system. Progress in this direction consists
of the observation that the addition of the hybrid features described above to a
dependent type system appears to be well modelled by taking a locally cartesian
closed category (well-known to canonically model dependent types) and adding a
monoid object. However, the behavior of the universal quantiﬁer over worlds does
not quite match up with its natural interpretation as a dependent function type
whose domain is the carrier type of the monoid object, i.e. the type of worlds.
The reason for this is that the system given syntactically treats worlds in a proof
irrelevant fashion [23], so we may need to use the techniques developed by Awodey
and Bauer [3] to express this categorically.
Finally, another important direction to pursue is trying to recover those connec-
tives that are not right asynchronous: ∨,⊥ in ordinary logic, ⊗, 1,⊕, ! in linear logic,
and ∗, 1m in bunched logic. The central obstacle these pose to the usual method-
ologies of logical frameworks, namely the presence of commuting conversions, has
already been addressed in CLF, [8,9] so we expect a solution along similar lines to
be possible. Given the semantic analysis [13] of the bunched ‘fuse’ connective ∗,
this may in any event also require treating some form of accessibility relation.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how to extend LF by a notion of world, and logical connectives that
explicitly manage worlds, yielding a hybrid logical framework HLF. Although these
worlds are diﬀerent from the ‘worlds’ in modal logics of time and necessity, they
react just as well to hybridization, in that the resulting system is very expressive. It
already subsumes one other well-known extension to LF, and promises to generalize
others. We conclude that hybric logic is useful to the study of substructural logics,
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just as it has been fruitful in augmenting the study of traditional modal logics.
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